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1. WAGES AS VIEWED FROM THE STANDPOINT 
OF THE POWER THEORY 
The price of labour, as wages, becomes the income of 
the labourer who offers in exchange labour (or labour power 
in the view of scholars of a certain school). While forming 
a contrast to incomes accruing from sources other than 
labour, or property income (or capital income), on the one 
hand, it represents the cost (price) income (the income as 
cost), together with land rent, on the other. By the cost 
(price) income I mean the income, which, as the price of 
final productive goods, is devoid of the nature of surplus, 
it being fixed, in a certain sense, independently of the actual 
price of the product. In another sense, of course, land·rent 
partakes of the nature of surplus value, but that is neither 
here nor there. 
Some explanation is necessary of my contention that 
wages mean the price of certain goods called labour. The 
word wage allows of a very narrow as well as of a very 
wide construction. The word in a wide sense is inclusive 
of the price of labour as indirect income. If that income 
be called direct income which one gets in compensation 
for participation in undertakings which supply products 
necessary for the material life of society, or for material 
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goods, and which is accordingly paid directly out of the 
price of the products, and if the incomes which are paid 
indirectly, in contradistinction to direct incomes, be called 
indirect incomes, the remunerations which doctors, rikisha 
men, geisha and servants receive may be covered by the 
word wages in a wide sense. The labour which is entitled 
to indirect incomes is generally termed service, and it is 
usual that such service directly benefits its recipients, instead 
of being appreciated through the materials on which it 
works. (This is a very generalised definition, but I have 
no time to offer a detailed interpretation of this point in my 
present" article). The so·called direct incomes contain various 
kinds of wages, but they may roughly be divided into those 
accruing from physical labour and those from mental labour. 
Among the profits which industrialists receive there are 
some whieh may be viewed in the same light as remunera· 
tions for labour, and these may well be regarded as compen· 
sation for the labour of supervision, a kind of mentaliabour. 
The word" wage" is generally applied to the price of physical 
labour exclusively, remunerations for other kinds of labour 
being designated as salaries. So far as economic theories are 
concerned, however, there is on warrant for treating them 
differently. In the present article, all indirect incomes will 
be left out of consideration, but the price of labour classed 
as direct incomes will be minutely studied, while taking 
the word wage in a narrow sense as the basis of the whole 
discussion (1) 
(1) With a view to precluding all misunderstandings that may be created 
in the minds of the readers of the present article, I append the following 
classification table:-
{
(3) Wages farr(l) Wages other than those 
{
l. 'Vages as mental labourl recelVed by industrialists 
W . direct in- (2) Wages for industrialists ~ges In a comes (b) Wages for 
WIde sense physicallabour=Wages in the narrowest sense 
2. Wages as indirect incomes 
Wages in the widest sense include both the wages classed as indirect 
incomes, and those classed as indirect incomes, and accordingly they are 
inclusive of aU incomes accruing from labour and service. Wages in the 
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narrowest sense cover the wages from physical labour only I which form 
part of direct incomes. In the present article, all wages classed as direct 
incomes will be dealt with. That is to say, the' article will treat, 
besides the wages from physical labour, of those from mental labour, not 
even excepting the wages received by industrialists. I believe that the 
wages theory as applied to the wages classed as direct incomes holds true, 
in substance, in regard to those classed as indirect incomes also, but I will 
in the present article confine my attention to the wages falling into the 
first·mentioned category. 
An enterprise consists, in a sense, in the will to take the profit or loss 
which is repeated regularly. The will to take the profit Of loss always 
means trade. It is not, of course, correct to say that the will to buy or 
sell things is in itself an enterprise. It is necessary that these transactions 
should be repeated regularly and that there should be a combination of 
goods. By a combination of goods 1 mean that the goods purchased are 
sold with certain other goods added, instead of being sold as they were 
bought. It is true that some men of business and scholars attempt to inter-
pret an enterprise chiefly in the sense of the operation of capital, but this 
point is outside the scope of the present article. If analysed with a sale 
eye to its essential parts, an enterprise means the will to trade regularly 
in the goods which are a combination of articles, that is to say, the goods 
purchased combined with some other articles. Such trade essentially requires 
capital, and consequently capital is a concomitant of an enterprise. 
If an enterprise is interpreted in this way, it will be clear that an enter-
prise is not simply to carryon production by combining productive elements. 
It may cover a far more extensive scope of economic actions. Such being 
the case, it is not quite correct to regard the so·called direct incomes as 
incomes which are in keeping with the position occupied in an enterprise 
or with economic functions. As a matter of fact, primary incomes are in-
comes accruing from participation in the supply of material goods (or the 
integral property), and consequently it is necessary to divide enterprises 
into direct or principal enterprises, and indirect or collateral enteprises. Those 
enterprises that participate in the supply of material goods are principal, while 
the others are colIateral. Thus defined, the incomes received according to 
economic functions in principal enterprises may be called direct incomes. 
The principal enterprises include, above all things, ordinary productive 
industries. The transport business and the warehousing industry, which are 
of a nature to influence material goods in one way or another, fall into the 
category of principal enterprises also. So can all trades which are designed 
to serve the purpose of tacilitating the supply of the goods produced be 
counted among the principal enterprises. The banking and trust busi-
nesses· which mediate and promote the supply of funds to these enterprises 
also belong to this category. On the other hand, such enterprises as aim 
at the supply of goods called service (not rendered through the production 
of goods), the supply of land, residences or suchlike things necessary for 
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material goods, and the supply of consumptive credit may be classed as 
collateral enterprises. 
As already repeatedly stated, wages are incomes which 
those who give labour get as its price, but labour is not a 
product of other productive goods. It is the so·lalled final 
productive goods or the goods of highest order. The view 
that wages depend on the cost of producing labour is often 
advanced, but it cannot be maintained. Why it is infeasible 
requires an elaborate exposition. Suffice it to say here that 
the idea underlying this point of view thet labour is a pro-
duct cannot be accepted. To discuss the matter from one 
angle, all items of distribution go to support the life of those 
who get them. As industrialists live on profits accruing 
from their enterprises, capitalists on the interest on capital, 
and landowners on land-rent, so do labourers subsist on their 
wages. Where there are labourers carrying on their ex-
istence, there is necessarily labour or capacity for labour. 
Inasmuch as all incomes are essentially employed for the 
maintenance of existence, there is no reason why wages 
alone should be regarded as the cost of producing labour. 
From another point of view, it is impossible to argue that 
industrialists or capitalists produce labour. It is true that 
the masters of slaves produce slavery, for they can mani-
pulate their slaves as they do their cattle, by virtue of their 
supply of food and clothing and their absolute hold on the 
lives of their slaves. In this case, however, industaialists 
can have no right to the lives of these poor men after their 
term of service has expired, none the more because it may 
be supported with the wages which they have given them. 
Is it, then, proper to think that labour is produced by 
labourers themselves for the sake of their wages? Products 
are by their nature increased or reduced in amount at will 
in accordance with a rise or fall in prices, but in the case 
of labourers they cannot either increase or reduce their 
labour; they cannot exert their will over the amount of 
labour. All that we see is the amount of labour co-existent 
with their life. It is, of course, possible that there occurs 
-~-~~- .. ~-----~ -~-----------------------~~-~~~ 
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an increase of population in a long space of time with the 
advance of wages, and the labour population increases or 
decreases in consequence of migration, but this increase or 
decrease in population does not occur in synthetic economics 
within a limited isolated sphere, and consequently there is 
no occasion for taking such a contingency into consideration 
in our idealistic study of the subject. Furthermore, the in· 
crease of population by no means indicates that it is brought 
about by labourers of their own free will for a period chosen 
by themselves. It is simply the natural outcome of their 
mode of existence. Thus, labour lacks the attributes which 
allow of the interpretation that it is a product produced by 
labourers of their own free will. Labour, like land (or the 
utility of land), is final productive goods which automa· 
tically exist. 
The price of final productive goods cannot be determined 
by the cost of production, because they are not produced 
and consequently do not involve any cost of production. 
Although there is a tendency for the prices of other goods, 
that is, those which are products in one sense or another, 
to be ultimately determined by the cost of production, the 
price of final productive goods-the price of labour under 
review, for instance-is not determined by the prices of 
other goods. It changes automatically. It partakes of the 
nature of an independent invariable amid a variety of prices 
that balance and influence one another. There are, of course, 
certain limits to its fluctuations, but within these limits it 
fluctuates independently of all others. There are causes for 
its fluctuations, but these causes are not economic. It is for 
this reason that its fluctuations can be described as automatic 
from the point of view of political ecomomy. Let me ex· 
plain this point at some length. 
The only possible answer to the question of how wages 
are fixed is that relations of power determine them. In 
order to simplify the problem, I will set aside the considera· 
tion of the heterogeneity of labour and the different scales 
of wages, and proceed on the assumption that labour is all 
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of the same nature and the wages of a single kind. Regard· 
ing different scales of wages, I propose to deal with them 
in a later chapter. Theoretically speaking, the minimum 
wage may be of a size that is little better than zero, if only 
temporarily. The minimum wage of any dnrable nature 
must, however, be of a size which enables the labourer and 
his family to maintain the so-called biological existence. 
While on the other hand, it is theoretically conceivable that 
the maximum wage can be, if for a time, far in excess of 
the price of the goods produced by the labour of the labourer, 
though the maximum wage of a durable character must neces-
sarily be the price of the goods produced (minus, of course, 
compensation for the consumed part of capital). As to the 
point between these two extremes at which wages are to 
be actually fixed, it depends upon the relative influence of 
those who require labour and those who supply it. In com-
mon parlance, the social influence ot labourers is decisive 
of the scale of wages. 
According to the theory hitherto accepted, wages depend 
on the relation between demand and supply. So far as it 
goes, this dictum is, of course, indisputable, but how are 
demand and supply determined? The generally accepted 
theory maintains that as the supply is generally determined 
by the cost of production, the supply of labour is determined 
by the cost of production in the shape of the means of 
livelihood (which are looked upon as the cost of producing 
labour. The means of livelihood may be interpreted in 
many ways, and this phase of the question I will discuss later 
on). Such being the case, it is fair to say that the supply of 
labour depends solely on the means of livelihood. As to the 
demand, it is determined by the so-called productive power 
(productivity) of labour. The general term of the pro-
ductivity of lahour is here employed, but what it signifies 
is defined variously by scholars. For instance, those scholars 
who advocate the marginal productivity theory define it as 
the price of the product secured by the marginal unit of 
labour. From the point of view of another theory, the pro-
- --------- - - ------ - ---- ----------
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ductivity of labour means the part of the price of the 
product left, which can be paid for labour, after the con-
sumed part of capital, land·rent and interest (and a reasonable 
margin of profit, besides) have been deducted from the total 
price. Though different in many respects, these definitions 
have this in common, that what is left after the capital in-
come has been deducted is the productivity of labour, 
and that the demand for labour is determined by that. 
But such a view cannot be accepted. In the first place, 
it is not the means of livelihood, as the costs of the produc-
tion of labour are regarded, that determines the supply 
price of labour and the curve of supply, for, as already 
mentioned, the means of livelihood for labourers are not the 
costs of labour production. As a matter of fact, what 
labourers expect to gain by their resolution determines the 
supply price of labour. Needless to say, it cannot go beyond 
the maximum and minium limits. In actual practice, how-
ever, the requisite means of livelihood for them are what 
labourers have been customarily obtaining as wages or what 
their employers have been customarily paying them and 
estimating in their profit and loss accounts. Thus, partly 
by force of custom and partly by mutual expectation 
on the part of those who demand labour and those who 
supply it, the amount of wages is usually anticipated. 
So long as there occurs no fresh change in the social 
position of labourers or so long as no marked rise or 
fall takes place in the price of the particular product 
concerned, therefore, the amount of which labourers demand 
as wages will, as a general rule, be determined by the means 
of livelihood which they require. It will thus be seen that 
the approximation of the required means of livelihood and 
the supply price of labour to each other is due, not to the 
fact that the former constitute the cost of production, but 
to the fact that the extent to which labourers can exert 
their influence on their employers (their influence on the 
whole mechanism of society also) leads them to make up their 
minds to demand that much. This curve of labour supply 
-------.. ------.-.. ---~-----~. ----- - - -- -----~ 
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is not unalterably fixed even under given circumstances. It 
is subject to change within certain limits, so long as 
labourers think that they are capable of altering the extent 
of their influence on their employers more or so long 
as they can change their estimate of their influence with 
them. In this way, strictly speaking, theil' is a certain curve 
surface, or many possible supply prices. Of these, labourers 
choose a certain supply curve and a certain supply price, 
which they make up their minds to claim. In the second 
place, similar conditions obtain in regard to the demand 
curve of labour. Divers theories are advanced as to how 
the demand price of labour is determined. It is not my 
purpose to examine each of these theories, but it is a fact 
that what industrialists estimate as the maximum demand 
price of labour is that part of the price which they generally 
attribute to labour, or that part of the price produced by 
labour. It represents the balance of the price of the product 
(since wages are paid in advance, this price means the esti· 
mated price) after the land'rent, interest and a reasonable 
amount of profit have been deducted. Industrialists are 
prepared to pay that much for labour, if occasion demands. 
As I have already mentioned, the highest point to which 
the demand price of labour can rise is, of course, the price 
of the product (minus the consumed part of capital). The 
demand price which industrialists name is not, however, 
the de facto maximum demand price. It is fixed at a point 
to which the demand of labourers can be reduced or to 
which industrialists think they can reduce it. It is fixed, so 
to speak, by an estimate of the relative power of capital 
and labour. In actual practice, it is assumed, on the one 
hand, that labour cannot be purchased unless a price large 
enough to enable labourers to maintain their present standard 
of living is paid, and attempts are made, on the other, not 
to pay more than that, the required means of livelihood 
detennine the amount of the demand price, in most cases. But 
when the strong attitude of the suppliers of labour makes 
it necessary for industrialists to anticipate the need of pay-
22 Y. TAKATA 
ing more, the demand price of labour rises accordingly, the 
demand of labourers being duly reflected upon it. In fact, 
it can easily be raised to the de facto maximum price. In 
some extreme cases, it is even possible for the demand price 
. to go on rising until it becomes equal to the total price of 
the product by encroaching on the profit and absorbing 
interest and even land·rent. Thus, it can be noticed that in 
the background of the demand curve of labour is the demand 
curve surface. A certain line on this surface forms the 
demand curve. In other words, the demand price is indifi· 
nite. It is the circumstances prevailing at the time that 
make it definitive and an unalterable entity, on which in· 
dustrialists take their stand. 
In this case, how does the attitude of both parties, viz. 
those who demand labour and those who supply it, 
bear on the value of exemption from indemnification (the 
value in saving)? Let me first consider the position of the 
suppliers of labour. They do not produce their labour at 
any definite cost of production, and so it is impossible that 
its cost of production determines its value of exemption 
from indemnification. Besides, their labour is of no use or 
value to themselves (unless it is sold to industrialists). 
Accordingly, when it is sold, there is no need whatever for 
obtaining it again by paying a price for it. Such being the 
case, its possession does not exempt them from any form 
of indemnification. In other words, its value of exemption 
from indemnification is nil. Thus, the suppliers of labour, 
which is final productive goods (or to use a different term, 
productive goods of the last degree), are capable of lowering 
their wages to a point which is little higher than zero, but 
as a matter of fact, they try to get as high wages as possi· 
ble in accordance with their social power, and the existing 
relative power practically decides the amount of the wages 
which they demand. This demand acts upon those who are 
in need of labour, and the labour value of exemption from 
indemnification is determined. That is to say, value of ex· 
emption from indemnification which industrialists put on 
---"~--
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labour depends on the price which they conclude they must 
pay for labour in the existing relative power of capital 
and labour. It embodies neither the maximum limit, viz. 
the price of the goods produced by labour, nor the balance 
of the price after interest and land·rent have been deducted. 
The value of exemption from indemnification, which deter· 
mines the attitude of industrialists, represents only the 
reflection of the demand made by labourers in view of the 
influence which they wield. Some people may argue that 
inasmuch as the price of the product minus interest, land-
rent and a reasonable margin of profit is the price which 
industrialists are ready to pay labourers, that is to say, the 
price ordinarily attributed to labour, and as the wages which 
labourers demand cannot, as a general rule, exceed this 
limit, the labour demand for wages necessarily presupposes 
interest and profit. To this contention, it may be pointed 
out thaf although in the present economic system interest 
and profit, no doubt, power and regulate wages, yet judged 
from the natural order of things, interest and profit cannot 
be determined without presupposing a certain amount of 
wages, because they partake of the nature of surplus. On 
the contrary, wages are essentially fixed with the demand 
of labourers mainly in view. Industrialists have no alter-
native but to buy labour. If they must purchase labour, 
they must of necessity pay wages which are determined by 
the relations of power. The wages paid by them are neces-
sarily included in the price of the product, in a static state 
at least, and it is not of a nature to be counted as surplus. 
Thus, wages determine the price, but they are not determined 
by the price. It is only when the price comes to contain a 
surplus due to various fortuitous circumstances that wages 
are conditioned by interest and profit as the secondary re-
actionary operation of this surplus. From the point of view 
of their essential nature, wages are a sort of thing to be 
fixed independently of all other factors. They are not 
determined by the income in the shape of a surplUS. As 
the price of final productive goods, they constitute the start-
-----_._._----------------- .------'--------------~ 
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ing point of the formation of the price of the product. not 
the last or the intermediate stage of the process. 
Thus. I prefer to take the following view of the mecha-
ni3m of the determination of wages. The supply curve of 
labour is determined by the demand of labourers. which is. 
as a general rule. based on their standards of living. The 
personal circumstances of labourers may differ. Some 
labourers may make bigger demands than others. because 
they form a higher estimate of their social power than 
others do. while some others may be inclined to work at 
low wages brcause of their distressing financial circumstances. 
Or in some other cases. labourers may be content with low 
wages on account of the small familY which they have to 
support. In such circumstances. a certain supply curve is 
formed within a certain limit with an elasticity to move up-
wards and downwards. The demand price of labour depends. 
on the whole. on the labour demand reflecting the social posi-
tion of labourers also. but it varies according to the individual 
circumstances of those who require labour. For instance. 
those who have a comparatively large margin of profit left 
after various items of cost have been deducted from the 
price of the product may be willing to pay a high price for 
labour. while on the countrary. those who are involved in 
heavy costs will have no alternative' but to give a low price for 
labour. In this way. the quantity of labour in demand can 
be indicated in the form of a certain demand curve. Need-
less to say. this demand curve is not inflexible. Even as· 
suming the price of the product to be unalterable. the demand 
curve is capable of moving upwards and downwards within a 
certain limit according to the attitude of labourers. At any 
rate. it takes a certain shape under certain circumstances. 
It is hardly necessary to point out that if both the demand 
and supply curves are given. the wage. which is the price 
of labour. can. of course. be fixed. 
One conclusion to be drawn from the proposition that 
the relation of power is the final judge of wages is 
that wages can be raised through the operation of trade-
A POWER THEORY OF WAGES 25 
unions. Those who deny such capability on the part of 
trade· unions may contend that so long as all other condi· 
tions remain unaltered, the state of demand for labour must 
also remain the same. It therefore follows that if wages 
can be raised by the power of associated trade· unions, it 
will be in regard to only a part of labour, the other part of 
labour being forced to be left a drug in the labour market. 
Even conceding that wages for all kinds of labour may tem-
porarily be forced up, they argue, there will soon occur a 
decline in the demand for labour in consequence of either 
the suspension or the reduction of enterprises on the part 
of some industrialists who find their business unprofitable, 
with the result that there will either be an oversupply of 
labour or a fall in wages. This view is, however, erroneous 
in that it is based on the false premises that the state of 
demand for labour and accordingly the demand curve of 
labour are invariably fixed. The demand curve is not ab-
solutely fixed; there is a narrow and long curve surface 
within the scope of which it can be fixed. Consequently, 
the demand curve moves within this scope according to the 
state of supply prevailing. If the activity of trade-unions 
changes the relative power so that higher wages are 
demanded by labour, the demand curve of labour, which 
has up to that time been determined with special regard to 
interest payments and profit, undergoes a corresponding 
change, the curve going up because of the drains to be 
made on the surplus. This is analogous to a change that 
occurs in the demand curve for finished goods in consequence 
of the growth of human desires. Thus, it is possible for 
wages to rise all round without causing a drug in the labour 
market. The rise may sometimes reduce the surplus of 
some enterprises so markedly that the industrialists con-
cerned may be forced to reduce the scope of their various 
forms of business and so there must, of course, be limits 
to the demand for higher wages. Where these limits lie is, 
however, a debatable question. In the maximum case, it is 
possible for wages to rise to a point equivalent to the total 
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of the price of the product (minus the wear and tear of 
capital), provided there is no change in the demand for the 
finished goods, but industrialists will naturally be inclined 
to- suspend business, unless they can expect a certain 
amount of surplus. The minimum surplus expected by them 
depends on the social conditions ruling at the time, and no 
sweeping definition is justified. It is evidently subject to 
constant changes. 
Let me now consider the case of maximum limit only. 
The price of the product of labour makes the highest limit 
of wages. Nominally, however, the rise of wages may be 
without limit. Let us suppose, for argument's sake, that 
labourers demand wages which, in the terms of currency, 
are above the ruling price of the goods produced by labour. 
In such cases, it is not absolutely impossible for industrialists 
to accept the demand of labourers, for if they can make 
up for what they pay in wages by increasing the price of 
the product, they will suffer no loss. The increased wages 
form the surplus purchasing power, which enables labourers 
to buy higher-priced goods, and if this process is repeated, 
wages in the terms of currency can rise indefinitely. But 
in practice, wages do not in any circumstances durably 
exceed the price of the product. 
2. THE PYRAMIDAL FORMATION 
OF WAGES 
Labour for which wages are paid is by no means of a 
single kind, though I put it in that way hypothetically before; 
it is of far more numerous kinds than is generally believed. 
It is generally divided into unskilled labour, skilled labour, 
intellectual labour and labour of women and children, but this 
does not cover the whole rage of variety. Each kind has its 
own labour market and in each labour market wages are fixed 
independently of one another to a certain extent. This 
being so, it may appear. at first sight that the law of one 
price for one thing does not rule in the labour market, but 
--.--.~--------.. ----- .---------- ----- --------' 
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seeing that labour itself is of various kinds, it is in the 
natural order of things that it should have many markets 
and the resulting many prices. 
One point of view has it that high·class labour can be 
reduced to common labour. It regards one unit of the 
former as equal to, say, three units of the latter, but this 
way of thinking is not tenable except when the amount of 
work done by each kind of labour is compared on the basis 
of the quantity of the goods that can be produced by each 
labour, and such cases are comparatively few. As a general 
rule, labour of different kinds is used for different purposes. 
It may be possible to regard A labour as being equivalent 
to twice as much as B labour, in the ligbt of the wages 
fixed, but this simply means a comparison of the price of 
labour, or the reduction of the price to units, not the reduc· 
tion of labour to units. The same thing may be said of the 
point of view which believes in a reduction of this kind based 
on a comparison of the price or value of the goods produced 
by labour. Various kinds of labour are required and sup-
plied because of their distinction from one another. The 
diversity of labour exists not only in regard to the classes 
of labour, but about the kinds of work done by workers 
belonging to the same class also. The classes of labour 
may roughly be divided into four, as already mentioned, 
while the kinds of work referred to practically means dif· 
ference in trades and skill. It is hardly necessary to say 
that there is a good deal of mutual adaptability between the 
kinds of labour belonging to the same class. Take unskilled 
labour, for instance. Unskilled workers can often be trans· 
ferred from business. A to business B, but there are limits 
to this adaptability, and beyond these limits, they have 
demands and supplies of their own, with their separate 
markets. That different classes of labour have separate 
markets is, of course, a well·known fact, but for the moment 
I wish to confine my attention to the study of the fact that 
different wages rule in different classes of labour. 
As the classes of labour differ, so do wages differ, and 
28 Y. TAKATA 
between these different classes of labour there is no mutual 
adaptability, with the result that it is very difficult for those 
in one particular class to accommodate themselves to the 
conditions in another class. Inasmuch as each class has 
demand and supply of its own, the wages paid for those in 
different classes are at variance. This phase of graduated 
wages is called the pyramid of wages. It is called the pyra-
mid for the following reasons. Setting apart the labour of 
women and children, unskilled labour has the largest supply 
with the lowest wages. The higher the wages, the smaller 
is the supply of labour (the number of labourers, in fact) 
and consequently there are very few, even among those in 
the highest class who get the highest scale of wages for 
their highest ability. If the size of the wages be indicated 
by a height from the base and the amount of labour avai-
lable for different scales of height by the width at each 
height, a shape something like a pyramid will be formed. 
It may not, of course, be exactly the same as a pyramid in 
shape, and an accurate idea of the shape cannot be formed 
unless we examine the wages statistics in all communities, 
but, on the whole, it seems undeniable that there is a 
tendency such as has been described. 
3_ THE EXPLANATION OF GRADES 
IN WAGES 
What is it that makes this pyramidal formation of wages 
possible, then? The first step towards the enunciation of 
this truth lies in making clear why there are grades in 
wages. Some scholars attempt .to explain the grades in 
wages by reducing the so·called high-class labour to units 
of common labour, but when these two kinds of labour are 
performed by altogether different persons, there can be no 
means of reducing one unit of the former into correspond-
ing units of the latter, so far as the work itself is concerned. 
If the reduction is based on the difference in wages, it 
would be simply begging the question to try to explain 
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wages by such reduction methods. It might appear possible 
to explain the grades in wages on the basis of the amount 
of non-economic compensation, arguing, for instance, that 
higher wages are paid for work which is filthy or attended 
by social dishonour, but, generally speaking, this merely 
explains only a small part of the difference in wages among 
labourers belonging to the same class. In different classes 
of labour, the larger the non-economic compensation, the 
higher the wages. Some people follow the lines of the 
costs of production theory and base their explanation on the 
amount of the educational and training expenses to which 
labourers have been put, but the difference in educational 
expenses is out of proportion to the difference in wages in 
many, if not most, cases. Moreover, skill is often acquired 
while at work and the workers who acquire it are put to no 
expense whatever. Such being the case, the above explana-
tion cannot be accepted. Lastly, there is an attempt to 
explain grades in wages on the ground of the productivity 
of labour, or the price of the product secured by a specified 
kind of labour. This assertion certainly does not commend 
itself. The argument that the pronuctivity of labour depends 
on the amount of the wages and that the latter is controlled 
by the former cannot be accepted at least in principle_ 
Setting apart the above consideration, it is an obvious fact 
that the difference in wages is not in accord or keeping 
with the difference in the productivity of labour. It is very 
often the case that the difference in wages for a superior 
skilled worker and for an unskilled labourer is very insigni-
ficant as compared with the difference in their productivity 
(taking the productivity to mean the amount by which the 
price of the product is either increased or reduced as one 
labourer is added or withdrawn). I do not, of course, deny 
all connection between the degree of the productivity of 
labour and grades in wages. Nor do I deny the influence 
of the former on the latter, but I do not think that the latter 
can be effectually explained by the former. 
In my opinion, the grades in wages are essentially due 
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to the divergence in the power of labourers. Supposing 
that different wages are given for the different classes of 
labour, A, B, C, and D, as, for instance, 100 for A, 80 for 
Band 60 for C, this shows that the social power of 
A is sufficiently strong to make it demand 100 and that of 
Band C 80 and 60 respectively. Thanks to their social 
power, they demand this much for their labour. As for 
industrialists, they try to combine labour and other produc· 
tive factors in a manner as advantageous to themselves as 
possible. They study how much labour of different classes 
is needed for producing goods of the value and quantity 
which they desire. The total of this demand on the part 
of all industrialists forms the demand function for a certain 
particular class of labour. If the demand for labour falls 
short of the supply of labour, it leads to two results. Either 
labourers, or suppliers of labour, must modify their demand 
and reduce the price of labour, or those who demand 
labour must make concessions, as in the case of those in· 
dustrialists who count on a certain margin of profit, there 
is usually room for concession on their part. In any case, 
by the continued operation of power, demand and supply 
are brought into accord and the wages are fixed, 
How do industrialists arrange matters, in such circumst· 
ances, so as to ensure profit? The marginal productivity 
theory contends that they study how to increase or decrease 
the marginal unit of some particular productive factor, labour 
in this instance, by fixing the required quantities of other 
productive factors, and then assume the proportionate increase 
or decrease in the price of the product. By this means, it 
maintains, they will determine the demand price of labour 
and the required amount of labour. This theory, however, 
forms a mistaken estimate of the mentality of industrialists 
in assuming ·that they will first fix the required quantities 
of all other productive factors. Industrialists try to discover 
the most profitable combination (combination of productive 
factors) within the scope of their enterprise, and the facts 
which they take into consideration in this regard are the 
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estimated price of the product and the estimated prices of 
productive goods (which determine the so·called value of 
exemption from indemnification), which are nothing but the 
suppositional supply prices (the prices which the supplies of 
productive goods demand). The required amount of labour 
and the demand price of labour are fixed in consideration 
of these supply prices. What would happen, if the combi· 
nation of productive goods should prove unworkable in the 
form previously determined, owing to disharmony between 
demand and supply? In such a case, industrialists must 
either alter the demand prices of productive goods by reduc· 
ing the margin of profits or induce the other party to alter 
the supply prices. In this way, a new combination which 
accords with the altered circumstances can be determined. 
The extent to which concessions will be made and the point 
at which harmony will he established depend solely on the 
state of relative power. The only decider of the amount 
of the demand price of labour is the demand put for· 
ward by labourers by dint of their power. The prevailing 
conditions of demand' and supply in the market may 
prevent the demand price of labour being fixed as labourers 
desire, but the demands of labourers furnish the basis 
on which it will finally be settled, though some modifi· 
cations of their original demand may be unavoidable. 
Industrialists base their calculation of profit on a comparison 
between the total amonnt of cost and the price of the pro· 
duct and they try to make the composition of the former as 
favourable as possible so that the latter may be increased 
to the largest possible figure. It is the estimated prices of 
productive goods that are the pre'requisites for the consi· 
deration of this composition, and these prices reflect the 
supply prices. 
Let us suppose that wages are fixed by such a process. 
The suppliers of labour of various kinds (that is, labourers) 
are not equal in their social power, and they demand a 
standard of wages. according to their respective power. 
Unskilled labourers, who are the largest in number, demand 
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the lowest wages because their power is weak, while skilled 
labourers usually demand higher wages than the former 
because they enjoy greater social power on account of their 
skill, or special art. In fact, it often happens that the goods 
produced by skilled labourers fetch specially high prices, 
and the fact that there is sometimes an inadequate supply 
of such skilled labour makes the wages paid for it all the 
higher. With regard to intellectual labour, it requires a 
certain amount of culture, and this culture leads to its high 
social power, which enables it to demand correspondingly 
high wages. The social power which culture bestows on 
intellectual labour, however, sometimes declines. For in· 
stance, it suffers when the spread of high education diminishes 
the public regard for intellect. In such cases, wages for 
such labour go down. This is not, be it observed, simply 
the result of an increased supply of labour; it is more 
fundamentally due to a change in its social power, for the 
only possible explanation of the difference of wages paid for 
labour of various Classes is the divergence of the social 
power held by each kind of labour. To cite a few notable 
examples to prove this contention, wages paid for women 
and juvenile labour are generally low. Notwithstanding the 
fact that in some kinds of work, women show as high 
efficiency as men, the former are content with two-thirds or 
even one·half of the wages of the latter, a fact which is 
mainly ascribable to the inferior social power of women. 
This disparity in wages becomes less in a society where the 
social position of women is higher. The same state of things 
is observable in regard to juvenile labour. Again, look at 
the peculiar conditions of labour in Japan. The wages which 
Korean labourers receive in Japan Proper are some per cent. 
lower than those paid to Japanese labourers, and this cannot 
be explained' except on the ground of the disparity of social 
power between Korean and Japanese labour. It is by no 
means due to the inferior quality of Korean labour as com· 
pared with Japanese labour. 
Thus, wages can be plotted as a pyramid consisting of 
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different classes of labour. Even in the same class of labour, 
wages are not equal. They differ according to the quality 
and amount of work supplied. In the first place, some 
labourers may produce the same kind of goods, say, "n" 
per cent. more than other labourers engaged in the same 
line of work, because of their closer application and better 
skill, while some others may produce goods of better quality 
than ordinary labourers can produce so that the proceeds 
from the sale of the goods can be increased by "n" per 
cent. Such labourers can be paid higher wages than those 
others to the extent warranted by the "n" percentage, by 
which the proceeds are increased, no matter whether their 
superiority is born or acquired, or whether it is the result 
of close application or of natural talent. The percentage 
of increase in their pay may not always be the "n" per 
cent., but it will be determined at a point approaching it. 
Here, on the whole, the so·called law of difference rules. 
Secondly, it may be supposed that in the case of labour 
belonging to the same class, the transfer of labourers from 
one kind of work to another can be easily effected, but such 
is not necessarily the case. Among unskilled labourers, such 
transference is comparatively easy, but it may, to a certain 
extent, be impeded by various circumstances such as customs, 
geographical distance, difference of physical power and the 
trade· unions. Among skilled and intellectual labour it is 
often extremely difficult, as skill and education cannot be 
acquired in a short space of time. Indeed, change of work 
is often absolutely impossible in one generation. Such being 
the case, even in respect of labour of the same class, there 
must needs be many different labour markets for different 
kinds of work, with more or less differing scales of wages. 
As regards the labour in demand in fields other than 
industrial, some scholars take the view that wages for this 
are, exactly like the price of finished goods, fixed according 
to the marginal utility, for, it is contended, it is exactly the 
same as finished goods in that it directly satisfies the desires 
of consumers. As for myself, however, I believe that the 
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wages for such labour also depend on the social power of 
those who supply it. There are, of course, some hindrances 
to mutual adaptability between labour in industrial fields-
between industrial labour and non-industrial labour espe-
cially-but they are nevertheless reciprocally transferable. 
It is, therefore, unlikely that wages for the latter should be 
fixed as simply as the price of finished goods is fixed. Need-
less to say, labour in fields other than industrial is required 
not for its contribution to production but for its direct utility, 
and yet unless the same wages are paid for it as are paid 
for labour in demand for industrial purposes, it will find its 
way into industrial fields. Nor is there, for the same reason, 
any necessity that higher wages than those paid for industrial 
labour should be paid for it. Thus, they are fixed in con-
sideration of the social power of labour-indirectly in the 
sense that they follow the scale of wages for industrial 
labour. Again, the price paid for non-industrial labour (apart 
from the above-mentioned connection with the wages for 
industrial labour) is fixed by the demand made by labourers 
by dint of their power. In practically all cases, the demand 
for labour of this kind (so· called service) is not continuous, 
nor is it sufficiently divisible. Its use value is, as a rule, 
far greater than wages. In such circumstances, the only 
possible way is to decide the wages on the basis of the 
supply price of labour or the demand of the labourers, with 
due regard to the relative power of employers and employees. 
Viewed from this standpoint, the quantity of non-industrial 
labour is by no means anticipated, and consequently its margi-
nal utility is absolutely indefinite. It is nothing more nor less 
than the demand of labourers that determines the general scale 
of wages. The state of the demand for non-industrial labour 
and that for industrial labour combine to operate in the 
direction of changing the above-mentioned labour demand. 
In short, from my point of view, the pyramidal for-
mation of wages reflects the pyramidal formation of 
the sacial power of labour. The power possessed by 
each labourer makes him demand a wage commensurate 
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with it. This demand forms the supply price of labour. 
The demand price of labour is based on the price of the 
product, viz. the proceeds. When these two prices do not 
agree, one or the other will have to be altered. This altera-
tion also depends on relative influence. Within the limits 
of the productive capacity of society, there is a possibility 
of the supply price demanded by labourers, no matter how 
high it may be, being accepted, for the price of the product 
is at least above the wage bill (so long as the increased 
wages are spent on products as surplus purchasing power). 
It therefore follows that the demand price is merely the 
index of the power which industrialists can hope to exert 
in reducing the demand of the labourers for wages. 
Even when the prices of products are the same, a variety 
of the demand prices of labour are possible. It is not the 
nature of the goods only that decides the size of the so-
called power by possession (the power which one exercises 
in giving goods in one's possession), but the social power of 
their possessors is also responsible for it. (1) 
(1) I am indebted to Oppenheimer for the expression of the pyramid of 
wages. My purpose is not so much to insist on the pyramidal formation of 
wages as to show that wages do not represent the price for labour of a 
single kind, but that there is a variety of wages for different classes of 
labour. Oppenheimer also recognises the so-called dual pyramid in regard 
to wages. There is, above the standard wages, one pyramid of higher 
wages corresponding to the degree of superiority in conditions or qualifica-
tions of labour, and, below them, the other pyramid of low wages corres-
ponding to inferior qualifications, of which the deformed, invalid and weak· 
minded form the base. Not much importance is, however, attached to the 
latter pyramid; the former pyramid always forming the chief subject of 
study. Oppenheimer says that farm labourers in East Germany constitute 
the lowest part of the pyramid in question. Owing to class pressure, their 
wages are the lowest, and consequently there is a constant flow of these 
labourers into urban districts. Labourers in urban districts get higher wages 
than farm labourers according to their conditions and qualifications, and the 
disparity between their wages depends on the so·called .. natural distance."l) 
Oppenheimer recognises a pyramidal formation in all kinds of income, and 
the pyramid of wages may be regarded as one notable example. I have no· 
1) Oppenheimer, Theorie der reinen u. politischen Okonomie, 1910. 
397, 410; ditto, David Ricardos Grundrententheorie, 1909. S. 237 ff. 
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time to dilate on Pareto's law, but it may fairly be said that it recognises, 
to a certain extent, a pyramidal formation in regard to incomes other than 
wages also)) Ammon's theory of class formation is a very emphatic form 
of the theory of the dual pyramid which Oppenheimer made light of, in 
practice, even while enunciating· it. 
According to the opinion of Lexis it seems that the theory of the 
pyramidal formation of wages is unsustainable. He insists that either in 
big industries or handicraft industries the number of labourers who get 
medium wages is largest. as is shown by statistics. Nevertheless I think 
that if the number of farm labourers, handicraftsmen, and domestic workers, 
who generally get lower wages than the labourers referred to, is taken into 
account, it will he seen that those who get the lowest wages are largest in 
number.2) Zwiedineck categorically traverses Oppenneimer's view. He 
argues that the grades in wages are by no means due to the disparity in 
fundamental conditions, that is, relative scarcity of labour. Labour markets, 
he contends, are many, not one, and each market has its own standards of 
wages required by its respective peculiar circumstances. To contends that 
the grades of wages are determined simply on account of the superiority 
of qualifications is to disregard the operation of these complex circumst· 
ances.3) 1 have no intention of discussing this point in detail. 
4. THE EXAMINATION OF DIVERGENT 
THEORIES 
Many theories have been advanced to explain the pro· 
cess by which wages are determined. As the present article 
does not aim at the historical study of theories, I will con· 
sider a few important theories out of many by way of 
proving the accuracy of my view. 
The cost of production theory deserves first attention. 
It is quite natural that those who take the line that the 
prices of all goods,-or, to be more exact, the natural prices 
which are, it were, the centre of gravity to which the market 
prices of goods tend to settle down in the midst of fluctua· 
tion-are determined by their respective cost of production 
should conclude that wages, which are the prices of labour, 
a kind of goods, are fixed by the cost of labour production. 
1) See my book entitled "The Study of Present-day Society" (in Japanese). 
2) Lexis. Allgemeine Volkswirlschaftslehre. S. 15!. 
3) Zwiedineck·Stidenhorst, Die Lohnpreisbildung, G. D. S. N, 1. S. 332. 
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The cost of production theory is not, however, of a simple 
nature; it contains a number of ramifying ideas. Here, I 
will confine myself to a study of typical views. The cost 
of producing labour means, according to the cost of pro· 
duction theory, the cost in which labourers are involved in 
supporting themselves and their families of a size which 
causes neither an increase nor a decrease in the population. 
If wages rise above this level due to some circumstances, 
an increase of population and consequently an increase in 
the supply of labour occurs, with the result that they will 
be lowered to this level again. If, on the other hand, wages 
fall below this level, a decrease in population and the result· 
ing diminution in the supply of labour will force them up 
to this level. Of course, it is not denied that due to various 
circumstances, the standard of living, which may be regarded 
as the cost of production, is subject to change. In any case, 
this theory contends, the relation of demand and supply 
operates to bring the prices of labour to the level 
of the cost of producing labour. This theory cannot be 
supported, first, because wages, and therefore the cost of 
living of labourers, cannot be viewed in the light of the cost 
of producing labour. As I have already explained in detail 
why they cannot be so regarded, I shall not repeat it here. 
Only I want to add that whereas the prices of all goods are, 
if the cost of production theory is accepted, determined by 
the cost of production, in the case of labourers, wages, 
which are the prices of labour, are evidently decisive of the 
cost of production. The standard of living, which is taken 
as the cost of production, is fixed according to the wages 
received. If so, the application of the cost of production 
theory to the price of labour will reverse the relation of 
cause and effect between prices and the cost of production. 
Secondly, recourse must be had to the process of a rise or 
fall in the population in order to explain why wages settle 
down to the standard of living (though some advocates of 
the cost of production theory do not refer to the question 
of population). Conceding that a rise in wages leads to an 
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increased supply of labour, it will take a generation for this 
increased supply to be realised as a sequel to the increased 
population. Consequently, it is inconceivable that the market 
price of labour will be lowered to the designated level by 
the increased supply of labour. Moreover, if the standard 
of living depends on habits and customs, it is quite possible 
that the advanced means of livelihood will come to form the 
new cost of production of labour. The same thing may be 
said as to decline of wages. This being so, the contention 
that wages find the level of the cost of production, which 
harmonises with the existing standard of living, cannot be 
endorsed. Thirdly, the uncertain nature of the cost of pro-
duction must be pointed out. It is clear that it is of social 
nature and does not merely refer to physiological needs, 
and consequently it can take various forms according to 
circumstances. Notwithstanding the contention that the cost 
of production determines wages, therefore, it is very difficult 
to judge its exact amount. Even apart from this considera-
tion, if, as is contended, the standard of living which cons-
titutes the cost of production depends on social conditions-
customs in particular-it means that the arbiter of wages is 
sought in non-economic factors, viz. customs, and it is noth-
ing but relations of social influences that are responsible for 
the formation of customs. Thus, it seems that the cost of 
production theory has in view exactly the same facts as the 
theory of social influence is based upon. 
As related to the cost of production theory, there is the 
so-called iron law of wages, which, though not necessarily 
a corollary of this theory, is a conclusion that may be 
deduced from it. It is contended that the increased labour 
population necessarily gives rise to competition for lower 
wages until wages are reduced to a point where it is barely 
possible for the lowest mode of living to maintained. This 
point of view regards the standard of living, the alterations 
arid elevation of which the cost of production theory does 
not necessarily repudiate, as definitely fixed at the lowest 
level. For the cost of production to take this form it is only 
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necessary to assume that the position of labourers vis-a-vis 
industrialists is very weak_ That this iron law of wages is 
far from the truth in spite of its advocacy even at present 
by influential scholars, is obvious from the fact that wages 
have substantially risen all round since the closing days of 
the former century_ Some advocates of the cost of produc-
tion theory clearly admit that the standard of living which 
constitutes the cost of producing labour depends on custom 
and is consequently changeable_ There is another theory 
related to the cost of production theory, and it is the so-
called wages fund theory_ This theory sees the existence 
in a specific community of a fixed fund out of which wages 
are paid in a certain specified period, and asserts that 
general wages are equal to the quotient of the division of 
this fund by the number of labourers, and that there can 
be no increase in general wages without a reduction in the 
number of labourers. This fund may sometimes be taken 
as referring to the amount of money paid as wages in the 
specified period, and at other times it seems to refer to the 
substance of wages or the total sum of money spent by 
labourers. The former means the fund for prices, while the 
latter signifies the total amount of substantial wages_ In a 
sense, the wages fund theory is inconsistent with the cost 
of production theory. The latter asserts that wages are 
amenable to the labour standard of living, and that conse-
quently the total amount of wages varies according to 
changes in the labour standard of living. The former, how-
ever, maintains that the wages fund is fixed in a certain 
specified period. A close study may reveal some possibility 
of reconciliation between these theories, but on the whole 
they appear to be incompatible with each other. Viewed 
from another angle, however, both may be regarded as run-
ning parallel and consonant with each other, in the sense 
that the wages fund merely marks the miximum limit of 
the changeable natural prices of labour or in that both strike 
a pessimistic note by signifying that because of the wages 
fund the demand for labour does not increase interminably 
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and wages are restricted to the level of the needs of liveli· 
hood. This is especially so, when the unchangeability of 
the wages fund is not stressed and the theory is merely 
regarded as a link in the chain of reasoning adopted in ex· 
plaining mechanism of demand for labour. No matter 
how the points enumerated may be interpreted, the wages 
fund theory has, on the whole, lost its dominant influence. 
Only a general survey of the. theory reveals points of in· 
congruity. In the first place, if the wages fund is fixed, the 
amount of money that is to be employed for the purchase 
of labour must necessarily be fixed, but such is by no means 
the case. Secondly, it is possible to make drafts, if occasion 
demands, on the proceeds of the sale of products during the 
same period for the payment of wages. Thirdly, industria· 
lists always choose the most profitable methods of combining 
productive factors, and such methods vary according to the 
prices of productive goods. It is, therefore, inconceivable 
that the amount of money to be paid for labour should be 
rigidly fixed in advance. (1) 
(1) Ricardo is a typical advocate of the cost of production theory. It 
will be clear from my article that the cost of production has a phase which 
may lead one to interpret it as the cost of existence. The nucleus of the 
argument in support of Ricardo's cost of production theory is the movement 
of the population,!) and Lassalle owes his famous iron law of wages to 
Ricardo's cost of production theory.2) There are nevertheless different 
opinions as to whether Ricardo's wages theory ought to be interpreted in 
such a pessimistic sense. It admits that the natural price of labour is not, 
in fact, fixed, that" it essentially depends on the habits and customs, of the 
people" (Ricardo, Principles, Gonner's edition, p. 74.) and that consequently 
it varies with ages and peoples. It also admits that natural wages them· 
selves are capable of moving upwards and downwards according to the 
state of population and the development of productivity. Taken altoge· 
ther. however, it is impossible to deny that Ricardo's wages theory is pes-
simistic.3) Through the operation of the law of diminishing harvests, there 
1) K. Diehl, ErHiuterungen zu Ricardos Grundgesetzen, Ed. 11. S 5-6. 
2) Offenes AI1.twortschreiben an das Zentral·Comite zur Berufung eines 
deutscJ:Ien Arbeiter-Congresses 1. Ill. 1863. Reden u. Schriften Ed. 11 1892. 
3) "The Study of Orthodox Political Economy" by Seiichi Tsuda. 
p. 226. et. seqq. Schrey, Kritische Dogmengeschichte des ehernen Lohnge-
setzes, S. 34 ff. 
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occurs a rise in the price of cereals and a fall in the rate of profit with 
the increase of population, and this' decline leads to a gradual diminution 
in the accumulation of capital, which brings about the relative decrease of 
the demand for labour (which means that the increase of demand, not be-
ing in keeping with the increase of population, falls short of the supply of 
labour). The result is that" so long as wages are regulated by the relation 
of demand and supply, they have a tendency to decline."!) It is not without 
reason that Cassel put this cost of production theory in a category of pes-
simistic theories. Ricardo deals minutely with kinematic problems such as 
the relation between the prices of cereals and wages and the relation bet-
ween the increase of population and the general progress of society and 
wages, but I refrain from all reference to these problems in the present 
article. With regard to my criticism of the cost of production theory on 
the third mentioned ground, I refer the readers to Zwiedineck's criticism.2) 
Again, in my opinion, the attempt to refute the argument based on the 
movement of population on the ground of the possibility of migration is 
misdirected, so long as the mode of handling the problem is idealistic. 
Since there occurred a substantial rise in wages towards the end of the 
19th century, the theory of the iron law of wages has gradually lost ground, 
though Oppenheimer still asserts that this law operates among the farm 
labourers in Eastern Germany, and believes that the pyramidal formation 
of wages has these farm labourers as the base. Thus, this law is regarded 
as determining the basis of the entire formation of wages. The so-called 
principle of centring in land takes the line that industry draws workers 
from agricultural districts and that higher wages paid in urban districts 
than in agricultural districts are the main inducement to farm labourers·3) 
In my explanation of the pyramidal formation of wages, I did not touch on 
the essential question of what constitutes the base of the pyramid. Nor is 
it apposite to deal with here the question whether the pyramidal formation 
really depends on the scarcity of labour. 
The wages fund theory, as described in the present article, refers 
chiefly to that of John Stuart Mill (though Mill renounced this theory when 
it was refuted by Thornton). Mill regards the so·called wages fund as a 
part of the capital appropriated for the purchase of labour (or a floating 
part of capital, to be more exact) ahd the amount of money, but not as 
actual materials of livelihood. Nor is this all. The fund for the employment 
of labourers other than industrial (servants and soldiers) is also included in 
it. (J. S. Mill. Principles, Book II Chap. XII.) From the point of view of 
the historical survey of theories, the wages fund theory ought to be traced 
1) Principles, p. 79. 
II) Zwiedineck-Siidenhorst, Die Lohnpreisbildung, Grundriss der Sozial-
okonomik IV, 1. 1925, S_ 324. 
:I) Oppenheimer, Theorie der reinen u. politi5C:hen Okonomie, 1910. S_ 
412 ff., Zwiedineck-Sildenhorst, a_ a. O. S. 328. 
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as far back as Mill. Ricardo's theory has a phase which gives it the appear· 
ance of a wages fund theory I but I shall not discuss this point here. Nor 
shall I take up in the present article the fact that in Mill's theory are mixed 
in uncrystalIised forms the cost of production theory and the pro-
ductivity theory which subsequently developed. My criticism of the 
wages fund theory in the present article is mainly based on the contention 
that the sums to be paid for labour depend on the demand for products. 
and therefore their prices. In order to realise the maximum estimated 
profit, producers have to give variety to their products and to arrange for 
the most profitab1e combination of productive goods with due regard to 
their prices in the manufacture of the goods which they choose to produce. 
In consequence, the amount of money to be paid as wages for a certain 
specified period is by no means unalterably fixed in advance. Moreover, it 
"is an old complaint that wages are paid, not out of the capital, but out of 
the proceeds of the sale of products. This complaint seems to require a 
close study, but I have no time to discuss it here. (Here I propose to 
give a few examples of noteworthy criticisms of the wages fund theory)[) 
The effects of productivity on wages have long been 
noted, but it is comparatively recent that the so·called 
productivity theory witnessed much development. Roughly 
speaking, the productivity theory can be divided into two 
kinds. One is what may be termed the general productivity 
theory, and the other is the marginal productivity theory. 
The latter takes the line that the productivity of the margi-
nal unit, so to speak, is decisive of the amount of wages, while 
the former maintains that the amount of wages depends on the 
productivity of labour in genera!, no distinction being made 
between ~he prod uctivity of the marginal unit and that of 
other units. Of course, the two theories will be in perfect 
accord, if the view be taken that the productivity of labour, 
no matter of what units, depend on that of the marginal 
unit, but let me here interpret the first-mentioned theory as 
defining that wages are dependent on the productivity of 
labour generally, in a sence other than the one mentioned 
above. As it is to the latter that special importance is 
1) Cass~l. Theoretische Sozialokonomie. 3te Aufl. 1923. S. 284; Schumpeter, 
Epochen cler Dogmen-und Methodengeschichte. Grundriss cler Soziaiokonomik 
I, 1. 2. Aufl. 1924. S. 94 ff.; Oppenheimer, a. a. O. S. 607 ff.; Salz, Beitrage 
zur GC:5chil;;hte und Kritik der Lohnfondstheorie, 1905; Cannan, Theories of 
Canan Production and Distribution, p. 271 et seqq. 
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attached in scientific circles to·day, I will begin with an ex· 
amination of the marginal productivity theory. 
Let me examine a typical marginal productivity theory. 
The argument set forth by this theory is this: Suppose 
that there exist in a certain specified society land and capital 
as they are at present. To this are added quantities of 
labour by degrees. Supposing that 10,000 is the unit quantity 
of this labour, the first unit of 10,000 will be allotted to all 
industries in the society in such a way as to produce the 
most profitable results, and under the law of diminishing 
returns, the quantity of products to be produced by this 
labour unit is the largest. Labour units are allotted one by 
one until the last unit of 10,000 is allotted to all industries. 
The contribution which the last unit makes towards increas· 
ing the total quantity of products will, however, be the 
smallest. Now, as, under the principle of substitution, the 
loss of labour of larger productive capacity supplied in the 
initial stages can invariably be compensated for by that of 
the smallest productivity that is supplied last of all, that is, 
the marginal labour unit, the amount of wages depends on the 
productivity of this marginal unit. Industrialists do not pay 
for the marginal unit more than its productivity warrants, 
that is to say, they do not pay over and above the amount 
equivalent to the price of the product that is more plenti· 
fully produced. On the other hand, they will have to pay 
up to that limit due to competition. For other units also 
they do not pay more than that, because these units are 
capable of supplanting one another, as already noted. The 
theory has, however, this difficulty at least that it is impos' 
sible to ascertain the productivity of labour additionally 
supplied. An increase or decrease in the units of labour 
supplied must necessarily cause an increase or decrease in 
the supply of other productive goods, and consequently the 
resulting increase or decrease in the profit is the outcome 
of the combined operation of these two factors, not the 
result of the operation of labour units only. How difficult 
it is to attribute this composite result to the productive 
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goods concerned in fair proportion can easily be seen from 
the explanation which I shall give later on. For the mo-
ment I will proceed with my discussion, apart from this 
consideration. The so-called marginal productivity of labour 
is, from the point of view of society as a whole, the increased 
part of the productivity of society which is ascribable to 
the last unit of labour, while, from that of each industry, 
it is the increased part of productivity which is due to the 
employment of the last labourer. To say that the produc-
tivity of the last-supplied labour unit is smaller than that of 
earlier-supplied labour units is a hasty conclusion which lacks 
logical necessity. The law of diminishing returns cannot 
be adduced as a proof of the correctness of such an assertion 
for the following reasons. If one alters the mode of utilis-
ing land and capital (as, for instance, the kinds and quan-
tities of capital goods) as the supply of labour is increased, 
one may often see that with the increase of labour there 
occurs a gradual decline in the rate of productivity, but if 
the mode of utilisation remains unaltered, it will be impos-
sible to say that the last unit of labour contributes less than 
any other unit to increase production. It would rather seem 
that the former usually contributes more greatly than the 
latter. It is also even possible to think that the first unit 
of labour is devoid of productivity. Such being the case, it 
is obviously possible for wages to exceed the total price of 
the product, if wages depend upon the productivity of the 
marginal unit of labaur. It is, of course, conceivable that 
industrialists will endeavour to increase the last unit of labour 
to the level of wages, but it must be remembered that their 
first aim is essentiaIlY the largest amount of profit. They 
seek the most profitable form of demand for production, of 
which a fixed amount of capital is capable, with the result 
that it is often possible that the capacity of the marginal 
labour to produce price is in excess of wages. Nor can it 
be denied that there is a possibility that labour cannot be 
increased beyond that. Thus, as I have explained elsewhere, 
this theory confounds the static increase of the unit of labour 
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(accompanied with no change in the form of capital, that is, 
the contents of capital goods) with its dynamic increase 
(accompanied with changes in in the form of capital). This 
theory also maintains that the same mechanism determines 
the interest on capital and that the total price of the product 
is completely convered by the interest on capital and wages, 
but for the reasons already stated, such arguments do not 
hold water. As regards other doubtful points attending this 
theory, I do not think it necessary to deal with them in 
detail here. 
There is another productivity theory. This theory has 
it that wages depend on that part of the price of the product 
which is attributable to labour, that is, the general pro· 
ductivity of labour, regardless of the question whether or 
no wages are dependent on the productivity of the marginal 
labour. According to this theory, wages depend on the pro-
ductivity of labour, as a whole. Setting aside the question 
of whether that part of the price will be paid as wages or 
not, it is true that it marks the maximum limit of the 
demand for labour. (If the marginal principle is to be ac· 
cepted, the value of every unit of labour is equal to the 
average of their productivity, for all are capable of substitu-
tion for one another, and the amount of the value depends on 
the contribution made by marginal labourers. Only this 
marginal contribution is not determined by the loss of the 
unit which is regarded as marginal labour). Then, how can 
the general productivity be determined? The price of the 
product must be allotted to all component productive factors, 
and this allotment must be made by the method of seeking 
the root of an equation by comparing various equations of 
production. This theory contends that only by means 
which meet these two conditions can the general productivity 
be determined. The productivity of all productive factors 
put together constitutes the total price of the product. This· 
point of view does not commend itself, however. In the 
first place, I think it is absolutely impossible to take a fair· 
attribution of the price of the product to all component 
---_ .. -_ ..• -- ---- -- - ------------ -- ---.-.--,.-------:-------------~ 
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productive factors. The reason for my thinking so will be 
dealt with in detail later on. Secondly, even if this can be 
done by the method of comparison, it does not necessarily 
prove the contention that productive factors. or the pro-
ductivity of labour, for instance, determines wages-the price 
of labour. From my point of view, it simply shows that the 
cost or the price of productive factors determines the price 
of the product, and that the there is equilibrium between 
the sum total of the former and that of the latter. I cannot 
understand the theory, which, while disavowing this conclu-
sion, takes the line that the price of productive goods 
depends on the amount of the price of the productive goods, 
which is worked out as the result of the allotment of the 
price of the productive goods. 
I will, next, explain why it is impossible to attribute 
the price fairly to the component productive factors by a 
comparative method of calculation (the equation methods). 
In the first place, in seeking the productivity of productive 
goods by finding, by comparison, the roof of the equa-
tions of production showing various combinations of produc-
tive elements (equations in which the price and quantity of 
productive goods and those of the products are shown to be 
equal), the equality between both sides, viz., productive 
goods and the product, will not be disturbed, if both are 
equally doubled or trebled; but so long as we accept the 
law of economy through organisations as a matter of course, 
this lack of disturbance is quite absurd. Consequently, the 
method of calculation by comparison has an insuperable 
difficulty at the outset. Secondly, all equations contain, 
besides the productive factors such as labour, land and 
capital, industries, or the position of industrialists, as factors, 
the value to be attributed to which is yet to be found, and 
these factors differ according to enterprises. Thus, it is 
absolutely impossible to seek the roots of the equations of 
production. In a static state, it may be argued that there 
are industrialists and .wages only and that there is no 
industrial profit in a narrow sense, which means that there 
---.--~ 
A POWER THEORY OF WAGES 47 
is no value attributable to the position of industrialists. This 
view may at first sighta ppear to remove the above· mentioned 
difficulty, but the static state is an ideal state which cannot 
be perfectly realised in actual economy. What really takes 
place invariably falls short of this idealistic state. In such 
circumstances, how can a comparison of the value of various 
given goods lead to the discovery of the value to be 
attributed to the prodUctive goods? It is certainly im-
possible to draw from a comparison of a number of equa-
tions the value attributable to productive goods, for there 
does not exist a definite relationship between the value of 
various productive goods and that of the product. Thirdly, 
what the calculation of imputation seeks is the possibility 
of profit which weighs most with industrialists. In other 
words, an answer is sought to the question: what value 
must be ascribed to certain definite productive good, and 
how the demand prices for these goods must be fixed ac-
cordingly.. What industrialists are really concerned with is 
a comparison of the prices and quantities of various pro-
ductive goods, of which they make use, and those of the 
product; they do not trouble their heads about matters 
concerning other industries. The calculation of the imputa-
tion of value by the so-called method of comparison, how-
ever, takes into consideration the relation between productive 
goods and products in many other kinds of enterprise as 
well. This clearly runs counter to the mentality of indus-
trialists. Their business policy is by no means ruled by 
such a comparative method of calculation. Fourthly, it is 
impossible to accept the argument that may be advanced 
that by such methods of calculation the marginal contribu-
tion or the marginal productivity can be ascertained. What 
must be accepted as the so·called marginal productivity is 
the productivity which is either lost or gained through the 
lost or acquisition of the last unit of labour, and nothing 
else. (2) 
(2) In the present article, I have dealt with two kinds of the pro-
ductivity theory on wages, What I described as' typical of the marginal 
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productivity theory is C1ark's theory of wages. As I have already had 
occasion to analyse and criticise it often, I have here refrained from 
entering into details. so I refer readers to the books which I have written,l) 
In my opinion, this theory does not prove the agreement of the prices of 
products with the prices of productive goods. It rather proves the possibility 
of the sum of the latter being larger than the sum of former. 
what I described as the general productivity theory is, on the whole, 
Wieser's view. In this connection, I must mention two things. First, there 
is possibly a more apposite general productivity theory. Zwiedineck-Siiden-
horst makes mention of Rodbertus, Carey. Schaffle, besides Ricardo and 
Thtinen. But as I thought it advisable to examine the view of a most recent 
distinguished scholar, I chose Wieser for the subject of my study. Wieser 
terms his own wages theory the marginal productivity theory, but in my 
view, it is not a marginal productivity theory, in the true sense of the term. 
The so·called marginal contribution of labour, on which it is thought wages 
depend, is, as a matter of fact, nothing but the general productivity of 
labour, as is fully illustrated by his theory of imputation. The marginal 
contribution in his sense does not embody the productivity which is lost 
though the less of the last unit of labour. This is shown by the fact that he 
rejected Bohm's method of imputation which consists in ascertaining the 
amount lost by the loss of the last unit, in saying that the method is not free 
from the danger of including in the productivity of the last unit, the producti~ 
vity of capital and land, which coIlaborate with labour. This fact shows 
that it has in view something beyond what is generally accepted as the 
marginal productivity. How can the marginal contribution of labour be 
found then? The only way is by means of the comparative method (the equa· 
tion method) (in the sense I have used the term). What is sought by this 
method is not other than the productivity attributable to all units of labour, 
not only to the last unit of it by this method of calculation. Let there be 
the following formulae: X+Y=lQO; 2X+3Z=290; 4Y+5Z=590 .·.X=40, 
Y =60, 2=70. That X is 40 cannot be made clear by a change in value 
resulting from the loss or acquisition of the last unit. It cannot be regarded 
as the marginal productivity. 
My first doubt is cast on this method of calculation itself. In order to 
solve the above·mentioned equation, it is necessary to obtain the formula 
2X+2Y=200 from X+Y=100, but since the law of economy through 
organisations rules, this is absolutelY impossible. Unless there is uniformity 
of technic and the consequent uniformity of the technical coefficient, the 
formula X+Y=lOO does not show that x in 2X+2Y=x is 200. It may be 
500 or any other number, and nothing short of the actual fact can show. 
This difficulty ceases to exist, if the uniformity of the technical coefficient 
can. be assumed, but such assumption does not accord with the actuality. 
1) "The Study of Economics." (in Japanese), Chapter 1. The Study of 
Clark's Theories, p. 213 et seqq. 
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Next, in Wieser's own view, the incomes of industrialists, or profits, are the 
part which ought to be attributed to the position of industrialists, and they 
differ as enterprises differ. They can be found by the method of speciaJ 
imputation, by which what is left after the prices of general productive 
goods, known as general imputation, have been rleducted can be attributed 
to special goods. (Theorie, S. 25 1.) If so, the equation which is given by 
actual production must be X+ Y +x=lOO, instead of X+ Y =100. All other 
equations of production contain new unknown numbers X2. X3. etc. as in 
2X+3Z+X2=290; 4X+ 5Z+X3 =590. On the basis of these equations, it is 
fundamentally impossible to find either general imputation, viz. the root of 
X and Y, or special imputation, viz. the value of Xh and X2' 
Conceding that the calculation of imputation is possible, as Wieser as-
serts, each unit of X will be worth 40. From the point of view of Wieser, 
this may depend on the marginal contribution of X, but from the general 
point of view, which believes that the marginal productivity of X is lost 
through the loss of the unit. it is not the true marginal productivity. Ac· 
cordingly. 40 belonging to X is the general productivity common to all units 
of X. In this sense, I have caBed it the general productivity theory. The 
first difficulty which this theory carries as an explanation of wages consists, 
as already stated, in the impracticability of the calculation. The second 
difficulty (which is counted among the reasons of the impracticability of 
calculation elsewhere in the present article) is the unlikeliness of the value 
.attributed by this method being actually taken into serious consideration by 
industrialists. Even if such imputation is perfectly possible, the value 
worked out will be of no practical use, if it is not taken seriously by them. 
It will of worthless as a theory for explaining actual distribution, In order 
to find the value of X from the given equation, industrialists must examine 
the relation between the cost of production and the amount of production 
not only in respect of their own industries but about many other industries. 
This is, in fact, not only an impossible matter but a thing which practically 
all industrialists are not doing. Such being the case, the aim of the impu· 
tation theory, which, according to Wieser, consists in examining how much 
profit an industrialist can hope to derive from one labourer and one machine, 
will not be achieved)) From my point of view, the equation given by 
Wieser indicates the eqUilibrium between the prices of productive goods and 
the price of the product, and also the state of the operation of the law of 
the cost of production. As the value of X is 40, the equations already 
given aTe possible. It is not because those equations are supported given 
by facts that the value of X is estimated at 40. 
The marginal productivity theory may be regarded as typical of wages 
theories in modem times, and I will consider a few of the criti~ 
cisms made of this theory. Cassel, who believes in the general theory of 
the formation of price that prices are interdependent upon one another, 
1) Der nattirliche Wert, S. 70-71. 
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takes the view that the marginal productivity is not in itself the predominant 
cause of the objective question of the formation of prices, but that it is, as 
a matter of fact, one of the unknown numbers. It ought to be put on the 
same footing as all other unknown numbers. Proceeding, he says that 
where labour is employed for many different sections of production, it be· 
comes impossible to define the marginal product correctly. As the marginal 
productivity must be the same in all sections of production, it can merely 
be interpreted as a share in the prices of all kinds of products. This price 
is amenable to the condition that such labour must acquire the same price 
in all sections of production. This being so, it is impossible to define the 
marginal productivity or this labour as anything other than this price, for 
it is this price that indicates the contribution of this labour to the prices 
of products. Thus, the proposition that wages depend on the marginal pro· 
ductivity of labour loses its independent meaning. 1) This view is shared by 
Amann with practically no modification. Amann says that the value of 
labour, or wages, is, after all, the same thing as the marginal productivity, 
for the marginal productivity means nothing more or less than what is paid 
as wages':?) I do not deny that the prices of all goods are interdependent 
upon one another. I only wish to find how the amount of wages 
is determined on the assumption that other conditions are equal. As I have 
already explained, this is possible. From this point of view, I cannot endorse 
the view that the marginal productivity is equal to wages. Wages are the 
price which is paid for labour, while the marginal productivity of labour 
depends on marginal labour in the prices of products. It is a part of 
marginal labour. Although the two things have a tendency to become equal, 
they are not exactly the same. Amann further says that as the price, the 
marginal productivity is not of an independent amount; it is formed in the 
course of the formation of value, and it also depends on wages. Thus, the 
wages theory is argument in a circle. But. so long as the marginal utility 
theory is accepted, the value does not depend on wages, and so it will not 
be correct to say that it is arguing in a circle. It is also contended that 
the marginal productivity itself is not objectively given, but if we take the 
supply of labour to be definitely fixed and the purchasing power and the 
demand co·efficient are given, the marginal productivity of labour can be 
deduced from them; it ought not to be regarded as an unknown number. 
I have, therefore, no intention of taking exception to the construction of 
this argument. I only wish to refer to my belief that there is a certain 
disparity between this marginal productivity and wages, in view of the 
mutual relationship of facts, and that even if they agree with each other, 
it is due to the operation of the law of the cost of production. In my view, 
there is a very strong possibility of the marginal productivity of labour not 
1) Cassel, a. a. O. S. 288". 
2) Amonn, Volkswohlstandslehre 1. S. 251. 
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being equal to wages, and even when they are equal, this equality is the 
result of wages determining the price of marginal product, not the result of 
the marginal productivity determining wages. 
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